The serpent has been hissing nearby, from the tent city that is about to be removed from McGill. A journalist friend was taking photos yesterday when he was asked to stop by some bright young thing who said it made her feel unsafe. Came the reply from my friend: "You're calling for global intifada and you're worried about feeling unsafe?" Well, yes, apparently. Neither facts nor logic seem to register any more. But here's someone for whom they do register: https://thenewconservative.co.uk/this-is-no-genocide/
I received through the post (not unhelpful) material reminding me of the atheistic assumptions of some libertarians and of Ayn Rand in particular, though Rand did not consider herself a libertarian. It should go without saying that the coalition I was calling for in part two could not extend so far as to include the likes of Rand. I do not regard Rand as a lover of liberty any more than I regard Lucifer as a lover of liberty; and that, as I said in part two, is essentially what I mean by "libertarian," though next time I will have a bit more to say to those who wear the label in a more technical sense.
Some reservations: I don't know Hegel or Dostoyevski well enough to have a definitive view about it, but I do doubt the probity of your contrast between the two great thinkers as being respectively proud and humble. I am confident that the Dostoyevski was not free of pride, and dismissing Hegel's thought as mere pride (or hissing!) is not instructive.
You write: "[The hissing] is designed to obscure the fact that God is the source of faith, as of reason; the source of liberty, as of law; the source of joy, as of justice. These are not antitheses in search of a synthesis. They are not contraries but correlatives. They do not need to be reconciled by us; we need to be reconciled by them."
But it seems to me that contraries are a kind of correlative; and if we need to be reconciled by them, that entails their being also reconciled by us.
As for excuse-making, that's an extremely important theme in the contemporary history of the Church's doctrinal-theological development/drift. I wonder what you make of Benedict XVI's claim ("we may assume..." he says) in Spe Salvi about the vast majority of us fallen men retaining a fundamental orientation (one might be tempted to use the word 'option') toward God, so that in the end very few of us will not be saved. Is that thesis not an exercise in, or an application of, the prevailing theological consensus in favour of 'excuse-making' (or 'hissing,' if one prefers)?
The essential point to grasp here is that there is nothing contrary in God (read Anselm on that) and therefore nothing in what God makes or does that invites our proud opposition rather than our humble cooperation. Anyone who reads Hegel (early or late Hegel) and who reads Dostoevsky (especially late Dostoevsky) will find in them different spirits, especially on this most fundamental point.
If you would like to know how I approach the former, you could look at Ascension and Ecclesia, chap. 5, but there is much more to be said than I say there. As for Benedict's Spe Salvi, he does not say what you say. He does say, in the final part, drawing on Dostoevsky, that "To protest against God in the name of justice is not helpful." Which is just what I am saying.
Interesting. You defend the specific claim that for Hegel, something in God's making and doing "invites our proud opposition"? I suppose strictly speaking the facts speak for themselves -- i.e., supposing proud opposition exists and God willingly permits it to exist -- and that Hegel is undeniably correct about that.
Long ago I read Fackenheim on Hegel's conception of God, and I don't really remember the details, but my perhaps fuzzy understanding is that on the point in question Hegel would agree with Anselm (and Aquinas and Aristotle), whatever legions of confused Hegel scholars might say to the contrary.
In Spe salvi (par. 45, 46), Benedict XVI wrote:
"Our choice, which in the course of an entire life takes on a certain shape, can have a variety of forms. There can be people who have totally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to love, people for whom everything has become a lie, people who have lived for hatred and have suppressed all love within themselves. This is a terrifying thought, but alarming profiles of this type can be seen in certain figures of our own history. In such people all would be beyond remedy and the destruction of good would be irrevocable: this is what we mean by the word Hell. On the other hand there can be people who are utterly pure, completely permeated by God, and thus fully open to their neighbours—people for whom communion with God even now gives direction to their entire being and whose journey towards God only brings to fulfilment what they already are.
"Yet we know from experience that neither case is normal in human life. For the great majority of people—we may suppose—there remains in the depths of their being an ultimate interior openness to truth, to love, to God."
And, Benedict concludes, the great majority ("we may suppose") will be saved, albeit as through fire. IOW, the great majority have excuses. They will be pardoned, forgiven, excused. Their sin is not mortal; not because it is not grave in kind (this claim seems to me self-evident); therefore because they have other excuses. The spirit at work here whispers "to know all is to forgive all," which corresponds to what seems to me (not a 'real theologian,' admittedly) to be the great revolution in the excuse-making spirit of moral theology in the 20th century.
(Anyway, that's a quick explanation of why I think Benedict XVI does indeed say what I said he says in Spe salvi.)
Thanks for the reference to Ascension and Ecclesia. It looks like I could get a paperback copy for just $241.97 through Amazon (ouch!). I do have a copy of your Ascension Theology (also surprisingly expensive) on the way. Perhaps there is some relevant material in there?
That's more expensive by a factor of ten than what I'm seeing. Of infinitely more importance: you are trying to see in Spe salvi what is not there. I repeat that Benedict does not conclude what you, misreading Paul and Benedict, conclude. (You would find David Hart much more amenable, it seems; but on that see my First Things article, "Harrowing Hart on Hell.")
Professor Farrow - have been wondering quite some time, at least over the past many weeks, why our prayer intentions at our Catholic Mass has not once asked for prayers for those suffering in the middle east? I do recall early on during the Ukraine conflict we were asked to pray for peace in that dispute, but we don't recall once where we either prayed generally for peace or specifically for the health and safety of innocent life in Israel and Gaza. Assume your Catholic parish follows the same guidance given to the US parish community? Thoughts on the rationale?
Where I attend, we don't do prayer intentions or 'prayers of the people' at Mass. But is there a paucity of prayer for the suffering of the innocent in Ukraine or the Middle East, or China and North Korea and central Africa? Yes, I expect there is. The reasons for that vary, but none of them are good. The hissing of missiles from Susa, and very likely to Susa, should be a stimulus for prayer.
Praise be to GOD! This awesome reflection by theologian, doctor professor D. Farrow, is also a reminder of what the future pope, Saint John Paul II said (1976) as Cardinal Wojtyla on his visit to the United States referring to these 20th century times as the ‘Final Confrontation’—humanity’s greatest historical battle:
Passover, which begins Monday evening, 22 April, may also serve to remind us of the nature of this conflict, its pattern, its eventual outcome. Prayer for Jewish friends reflecting on these things is timely.
The serpent has been hissing nearby, from the tent city that is about to be removed from McGill. A journalist friend was taking photos yesterday when he was asked to stop by some bright young thing who said it made her feel unsafe. Came the reply from my friend: "You're calling for global intifada and you're worried about feeling unsafe?" Well, yes, apparently. Neither facts nor logic seem to register any more. But here's someone for whom they do register: https://thenewconservative.co.uk/this-is-no-genocide/
I received through the post (not unhelpful) material reminding me of the atheistic assumptions of some libertarians and of Ayn Rand in particular, though Rand did not consider herself a libertarian. It should go without saying that the coalition I was calling for in part two could not extend so far as to include the likes of Rand. I do not regard Rand as a lover of liberty any more than I regard Lucifer as a lover of liberty; and that, as I said in part two, is essentially what I mean by "libertarian," though next time I will have a bit more to say to those who wear the label in a more technical sense.
Thank you, Dr. Farrow, an excellent read.
Some reservations: I don't know Hegel or Dostoyevski well enough to have a definitive view about it, but I do doubt the probity of your contrast between the two great thinkers as being respectively proud and humble. I am confident that the Dostoyevski was not free of pride, and dismissing Hegel's thought as mere pride (or hissing!) is not instructive.
You write: "[The hissing] is designed to obscure the fact that God is the source of faith, as of reason; the source of liberty, as of law; the source of joy, as of justice. These are not antitheses in search of a synthesis. They are not contraries but correlatives. They do not need to be reconciled by us; we need to be reconciled by them."
But it seems to me that contraries are a kind of correlative; and if we need to be reconciled by them, that entails their being also reconciled by us.
As for excuse-making, that's an extremely important theme in the contemporary history of the Church's doctrinal-theological development/drift. I wonder what you make of Benedict XVI's claim ("we may assume..." he says) in Spe Salvi about the vast majority of us fallen men retaining a fundamental orientation (one might be tempted to use the word 'option') toward God, so that in the end very few of us will not be saved. Is that thesis not an exercise in, or an application of, the prevailing theological consensus in favour of 'excuse-making' (or 'hissing,' if one prefers)?
The essential point to grasp here is that there is nothing contrary in God (read Anselm on that) and therefore nothing in what God makes or does that invites our proud opposition rather than our humble cooperation. Anyone who reads Hegel (early or late Hegel) and who reads Dostoevsky (especially late Dostoevsky) will find in them different spirits, especially on this most fundamental point.
If you would like to know how I approach the former, you could look at Ascension and Ecclesia, chap. 5, but there is much more to be said than I say there. As for Benedict's Spe Salvi, he does not say what you say. He does say, in the final part, drawing on Dostoevsky, that "To protest against God in the name of justice is not helpful." Which is just what I am saying.
Interesting. You defend the specific claim that for Hegel, something in God's making and doing "invites our proud opposition"? I suppose strictly speaking the facts speak for themselves -- i.e., supposing proud opposition exists and God willingly permits it to exist -- and that Hegel is undeniably correct about that.
Long ago I read Fackenheim on Hegel's conception of God, and I don't really remember the details, but my perhaps fuzzy understanding is that on the point in question Hegel would agree with Anselm (and Aquinas and Aristotle), whatever legions of confused Hegel scholars might say to the contrary.
In Spe salvi (par. 45, 46), Benedict XVI wrote:
"Our choice, which in the course of an entire life takes on a certain shape, can have a variety of forms. There can be people who have totally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to love, people for whom everything has become a lie, people who have lived for hatred and have suppressed all love within themselves. This is a terrifying thought, but alarming profiles of this type can be seen in certain figures of our own history. In such people all would be beyond remedy and the destruction of good would be irrevocable: this is what we mean by the word Hell. On the other hand there can be people who are utterly pure, completely permeated by God, and thus fully open to their neighbours—people for whom communion with God even now gives direction to their entire being and whose journey towards God only brings to fulfilment what they already are.
"Yet we know from experience that neither case is normal in human life. For the great majority of people—we may suppose—there remains in the depths of their being an ultimate interior openness to truth, to love, to God."
And, Benedict concludes, the great majority ("we may suppose") will be saved, albeit as through fire. IOW, the great majority have excuses. They will be pardoned, forgiven, excused. Their sin is not mortal; not because it is not grave in kind (this claim seems to me self-evident); therefore because they have other excuses. The spirit at work here whispers "to know all is to forgive all," which corresponds to what seems to me (not a 'real theologian,' admittedly) to be the great revolution in the excuse-making spirit of moral theology in the 20th century.
(Anyway, that's a quick explanation of why I think Benedict XVI does indeed say what I said he says in Spe salvi.)
Thanks for the reference to Ascension and Ecclesia. It looks like I could get a paperback copy for just $241.97 through Amazon (ouch!). I do have a copy of your Ascension Theology (also surprisingly expensive) on the way. Perhaps there is some relevant material in there?
That's more expensive by a factor of ten than what I'm seeing. Of infinitely more importance: you are trying to see in Spe salvi what is not there. I repeat that Benedict does not conclude what you, misreading Paul and Benedict, conclude. (You would find David Hart much more amenable, it seems; but on that see my First Things article, "Harrowing Hart on Hell.")
Professor Farrow - have been wondering quite some time, at least over the past many weeks, why our prayer intentions at our Catholic Mass has not once asked for prayers for those suffering in the middle east? I do recall early on during the Ukraine conflict we were asked to pray for peace in that dispute, but we don't recall once where we either prayed generally for peace or specifically for the health and safety of innocent life in Israel and Gaza. Assume your Catholic parish follows the same guidance given to the US parish community? Thoughts on the rationale?
Thanks as always --
DT
Where I attend, we don't do prayer intentions or 'prayers of the people' at Mass. But is there a paucity of prayer for the suffering of the innocent in Ukraine or the Middle East, or China and North Korea and central Africa? Yes, I expect there is. The reasons for that vary, but none of them are good. The hissing of missiles from Susa, and very likely to Susa, should be a stimulus for prayer.
I am using 'Susa' metonymically, of course, as in the essay I am using it metaphorically. Archaeologically, one might begin here, though I don't know about 'Straight Truth': https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/475900/Archaeological-findings-may-push-back-Susa-s-history-by-millennia.
Praise be to GOD! This awesome reflection by theologian, doctor professor D. Farrow, is also a reminder of what the future pope, Saint John Paul II said (1976) as Cardinal Wojtyla on his visit to the United States referring to these 20th century times as the ‘Final Confrontation’—humanity’s greatest historical battle:
A) Between the Church and the anti-church;
B) Between the Gospel and the anti-gospel.
Let me add, “between Christ and the antichrist”.
-Deacon Lawrence Farley 2024.03.29, Good Friday.
Passover, which begins Monday evening, 22 April, may also serve to remind us of the nature of this conflict, its pattern, its eventual outcome. Prayer for Jewish friends reflecting on these things is timely.